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The interpretation of technical and institutional change as endogenous rather than exogenous to the economic system is a relatively new development in economic thought.
In work published in the early 1970's we extended the theory of induced technical change and tested it against the history of agricultural development in the United States and Japan [Hayami and Ruttan, 1971; Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978; Wade, 1981] . It is now generally accepted that the theory of induced technical change provides very substantial insight into the process of agricultural development for a wide range of developed and developing countries. And economic historians are increasingly drawing on the theory of induced technical change in attempting to interpret differential patterns of productivity growth among countries and over time [Cain and Paterson, 1981; Phillips, 1982] .
The demonstration that technical change can be treated as largely endogenous to the development process does not imply that the progress of either agricultural or industrial technology can be left to an 'invisible 3 hand' that drives technology along an 'efficient' path determined by relative resource endowments. The capacity to advance knowledge in science and technology is itself a result of a product of institutional innovation--'the great invention of the 19th century was the invention of the method of invention' [Whitehead, 1925:96] .
In the case of agriculture, for example, in both Japan and the United States, much of the technical change that has led to growth of output per hectare has been produced by public sector institutions. These institutions--state (or prefectora1) and federal (or national) agricultural experiment stations--obtain their resources in the political market place and allocate their resources through bureaucratic mechanisms. The success of the theory of induced technical change gives rise, therefore, to the need for a more careful consideration of the sources of institutional innovation and design.
In this paper we elaborate a theory of institutional innovation in which shifts in the demand for institutional innovation are induced by changes in relative resource endowments and by technical change. We also consider the impact of advances in social science knowledge and of cultural endowments on the supply of institutional change. After examining the forces that act to shift the demand and supply of institutional innovation we then present the elements of a more general model of institutional change. The perspective on the role of institutional innovation in the process of economic development presented in this paper is much more positive than the views that were held by the American institutional school or in the recent literature on social choice and collective action [Zingler, 1974; Seckler, 1975; Olson, 1982] .
WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION?
Institutions are the rules of a society or of organizations that 4 facilitate coordination among people by helping them form expectations which each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others. They reflect the conventions that have evolved in different societies regarding the behavior of individuals and groups relative to their own behavior and the behavior 1 of others.
In the area of economic relations they have a crucial role in establishing expectations about the rights to use resources in economic activities and about the partitioning of the income streams resulting from economic activity--'institutions provide assurance respecting the actions of others, and give order and stability to expectations in the complex and uncertain world of economic relations. ,2
In order to perform the essential role of forming reasonable expectations in dealings among people, institutions must be stable for an extended time period. But institutions, like technology, must also change if development is to occur. Anticipation of the latent gains to be realized by overcoming the disequilibria resulting from changes in factor endowments, product demand, and technical change represents powerful inducements to institutional innovation [North and Thomas, 1970; Schultz, 1975] . Institutions that have been efficient in generating growth in the past may, over time, come to direct their efforts primarily to protecting the vested interests of some of their members by maintaining the status quo and thus become obstacles to further economic deve1opment. 3 The growing disequilibria in resource allocation due to institutional constraints generated by economic growth create opportunities for political entrepreneurs or leaders to organize collective action to bring about institutional change.
Our perspective on the sources of demand for institutional change is similar to the traditional Marxian view. as property rights and markets are more typically altered through the cumulation of 'secondary' or incremental institutional changes such as modifications in contractual relations or shifts in the boundaries between market and non-market activities [Davis and North, 1971:9] .
There is a supply dimension as well as a demand dimension in institutional change. Collective action leading to changes in the supply of institutional innovations involves struggles among various vested interest groups. Clearly, the process is much more complex than the clear-cut, two-class conflict between the property owners and the propertyless as assumed by Marx. In our view, the supply of institutional innovations is strongly influenced by the cost of achieving social consensus (or of suppressing opposition). How costly a form of institutional change is to be accepted in a society depends on the power structure among vested interest groups. It also depends critically on cultural tradition and ideology, such as nationalism, that make certain institutional arrangements more easily accepted than others.
Advances in knowledge in the social sciences (and in related professions such as law, administration, planning, and social service) can reduce the cost of institutional change in a somewhat similar manner as advances in the natural sciences reduce the cost of technical change. Education, both general and technical, that facilitates a better understanding among people of their common interests can also reduce the cost of institutional innovation.
Our insistence that important advances in the understanding of the processes of institutional innovation and diffusion can be achieved by treating institutional change as endogenous to the economic system represents a clear departure from the tradition of modern analytical economics. S
This does not mean that we abandon analytical economics. On the contrary, we try to expand the scope of modern analytical economics by treating institutional change as endogenous.
DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONAL I~TNOVATION--PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MARKET INSTITUTIONS
In some cases the demand for institutional innovation can be satisfied by the development of new forms of property rights, more efficient market institutions, or even by evolutionary changes arising out of direct contracting by individuals at the level of the community or the firm. In other cases, where externalities are involved, substantial political resources may have to be brought to bear to organize non-market institutions in order to provide for the supply of public goods.
In this section we illustrate, from the agricultural history of a number of countries, how changes in factor endowments, technical change, and growth in product demand have induced change in property rights and contractual arrangements in order to promote more efficient resource allocation through the market. In 19th century Thailand, the opening-up of the nation for international trade and the reduction in shipping rates to Europe resulted in a sharp increase in the demand for rice. The land available for rice production, which had been abundant, became more scarce. Investment in land development for rice production became profitable. The response was a major transformation of property rights. Traditional rights in human property (corvee and slavery) were replaced by more precise private property rights in land (fee-simple titles) [Feeny, 1982] .
In Japan, at the beginning of the feudal Tokugawa period (1603-1867), peasants' rights to cropland had been limited to the right to till the soil with the obligation to pay a feudal land tax in kind. As the population grew, commercialization progressed and irrigation and technology were developed to make intensive farming more profitable. Some peasants divided 8 their holdings into smaller units and leased them out to ex-servants or extended family members. Some accumulated land through mortgaging arrangements that made other peasants de facto tenants. As a result of the accumulation of illegal leasing and mortgaging practices, peasants'
property rights in land approximated those of a fee-simple title by the end of the Tokugawa period. -These rights were readily converted to the modern private-property system in the succeeding Meiji period [Hayami and Kikuchi, 1982:28] .
Research conducted by Yujiro tmyami and Masao Kikuchi in the Philippines during the late 1970's has enabled us to examine a contemporary example of the interrelated effects of changes in resource endowments and technical change on the demand for institutional change in land tenure and labor relations [Kikuchi and Hayami, 1980; Hayami and Kikuchi, 1982] The subtenancy arrangements are usually made without the formal consent of the landowner. All cases of subtenancy were on land farmed under a leasehold arrangement. The most common subtenancy arrangement was fifty-fifty sharing of costs and output.
It was hypothesized that an incentive for the emergence of the subtenancy institution was that the rent paid to landlords under the leasehold arrangement was below the equilibrium rent--the level which would reflect both the higher yields of rice obtained with the new technology and the lower wage rates implied by the increase in population pressure against the land.
To test this hypothesis, market prices were used to compute the value of the unpaid factor inputs (family labor and capital) for different tenure arrangements during the 1976 wet season. The results indicate that the share-to-land was lowest and the operators' surplus was the highest for the land under leasehold tenancy. In contrast, the share-to-land was the highest and no surplus was left for the operator who cultivated the land under the subtenancy arrangement (Table 1) . Indeed, the share-to-land when the land was farmed under subtenancy was very close to the sum of the share-to-land plus the operators' surplus under the other tenure arrangement.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis. A substantial portion of the economic rent was captured by the leasehold tenants in the form of operators' surplus. On the land farmed under a subtenancy arrangement, the rent was shared between the leaseholder and the landlord.
A second institutional change, induced by higher yields and the increase in population pressure, has been the emergence of a new pattern of employer-labor relationship between farm operators and landless workers. According to the traditional system called hunusan, laborers who participated in the lnblc harvesting and threshing activity received a one-sixth share of the paddy (rough rice) harvest. By 1976, most of the farmers (83 percent) adopted a system called gamma, in which participation in the harvesting operation was limited to workers who had performed the weeding operation without receiving wages.
The emergence of the gamma system can be interpreted as an institutional innovation designed to reduce the wage rate for harvesting to a level equal to the marginal productivity of labor. In the 1950's, when the rice yield per hectare was low and labor was less abundant, the one-sixth share may have approximated an equilibrium wage level. With the higher yields and the more abundant supply of labor, the one-sixth share became larger than the marginal product of labor in the harvesting operation. 8
To test the hypothesis that the gamma system was adopted rapidly primarily because it represented an institutional innovation that permitted farm operators to equate the harvesters' shares of output to the marginal productivity of labor, imputed wage costs were compared with the actual harvesters' shares ( Table 2 ). The results indicate that a substantial gap existed between the imputed wage for the harvesters' labor alone and the actual harvesters' shares. This gap was eliminated if the imputed wages for harvesting and weeding labor were added.
Those results are consistent with the hypothesis that the changes in institutional arrangements governing the use of production factors were induced when disequilibria between the marginal returns and the marginal costs of factor inputs occurred as a result of changes in factor endowments and technical change. Institutional change, therefore, was directed toward the establishment of a new equilibrium in factor markets. 
Efficiency and equity implications
It is important to recognize that subtenancy and gamma contracts were the institutional innovations to facilitate more efficient resource allocations through voluntary agreements by assigning more complet~ private property rights. The land reform laws gave tenants strong protection of their tenancy rights with the result that a part of land property rights, which is the right to continue tilling the soil at a rent lower than the marginal product of land, was assigned to tenant operators. But the laws prohibited tenants from renting their land to someone else who might utilize it more efficiently, when they become elderly or found more profitable off-farm employment, for example. Subtenancy was developed to reduce such inefficiency due to the institutional rigidity in the land rental market based on the land reform programs. Likewise, the gamma system was developed to counteract the institutional rigidity in the labor market based on the traditional custom in the rural community in the form of a fixed harvester's share.
It might appear that these institutional innovations increased efficiency at the expense of equity. But, if the subtenancy system had not been developed, the route would have been closed for some of the landless laborers to become farm operators and use their entrepreneurial abilities more profitably. If the implicit wage rate for harvesting work had been raised in the absence of the gamma contract, it might have encouraged mechanization in threshing and thereby reduced employment and labor earnings.
It must be recognized that the institutional innovations to develop more efficient market by assigning more complete private property rights do not necessarily impair equity, as is often argued by Marxist and populist critiques against private market institutions.
In the case reviewed here the induced innovation process leading toward the establishment of equilibrium in factor markets occurred very rapidly in spite of the fact that many of the transactions--between landlords, tenants, and laborers--were less than fully monetized. Informal contractual arrangements or agreements were utilized. The subleasing and the gamma labor contract evolved without the mobilization of substantial political activity or bureaucratic effort. Indeed, the subleasing arrangement evolved in spite of legal prohibition. Where substantial political and bureaucratic resources must be mobilized to bring about technical or institutional change, the changes occur much more slowly, as in the cases of the English enclosure movements and the Thai and Japanese property rights cases referred to at the beginning of this section.
THE DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION--NON-MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS
The examples of institutional change advanced in the previous section, such as the Enclosure in England and the evolution of private property rights in land in Japan and Thailand, have contributed to the development of a more efficient market system. Institutional changes of this type are profitable for society only if the costs involved in the assignment and prot~ction of rights are smaller than the gains from better resource allocation. If those costs are very high, it may be necessary to design non-market institutions in order to achieve more efficient resource allocation. 9
For example, in Japan, although the system of private property rights was developed on cropland during the pre-modern period, communal ownership ll Action by a higher authority with coercive power, such as government, may be required to limit free riding.
The 'socialization' of agricultural research is common not only in socialist economies but also in market economies [Hayami and Yamada, 1975: 224-49] . This can be explained by the failure of the market in allocating resources efficiently for the supply of public goods for a large, unidentifiable clientele group. New information or knowledge resulting from research is typically endowed with the attributes of a public good characterized by nonrivalness or jointness in supply and utilization, and nonexcludability 12 or external economies.
The first attribute implies that the good is equally available to all. The second implies that it is impossible for private producers to appropriate through market pricing the full social benefits arising directly from the production (and consumption) of the good--it is difficult to exclude from the utilization of the good those who do not pay for it. A socially optimal level of supply of such a good cannot be expected if its supply is left to private firms. However, present institutional arrangements are such that much information resulting from basic research is nonexcludable. This is the major reason why it has been necessary to establish nonprofit institutions to advance basic scientific 13 knowledge.
A unique aspect of agricultural research, particularly that directed to advancing biological technology, is that many of the products of research--even in the applied area--are characterized by nonexcludability.
Protection by patent laws is either unavailable or inadequate. The nature 18 of agricultural production to be conducted would make it difficult to restrict information about new technology or practices. Furthermore, even the largest farms are relatively small units and would not be able to capture more than a small share of the gains from inventive activity.
Private research activities in agriculture have been directed primarily toward developing mechanical technology for which patent protection is established.
14 Another important attribute of the research production function is that it has a stochastic form. Research, by nature, is characterized by risk and uncertainty. Success in a research project is like hitting a 'successful oil well.' Any number of dry holes may be bored before the successful one is found. Richard Nelson has pointed out that this stochastic nature of the research production function, which is especially strortg in the case ot basic research, contributes to the failure of the market in attaining optimum resource allocation over time:
'The very large variance of the profit probability distribution from a basic research project will tend to cause a risk-avoiding firm, without the economic resources to spread the risk by running a number of basic-research projects at once, to value a basic-research project at significantly less than its expected profitability and hence, .
•. at less than its social value' [Nelson, 1959: 3041.
The public-good attributes of the agricultural research product together with the stochastic nature of the research production function make public support of agricultural research socially desirable. It does not necessarily follow, however, that agricultural research should be conducted in governmental institutions financed by tax revenue. The social benefit produced by agricultural research can be measured as the sum of increases in consumers' and producers' surpluses due to the downward shift in the supply function of an agricultural product. If the benefit consists primarily of producers' surplus, agricultural research may be left to the cooperative activities of agricultural producers (i.e., to the activities of such institutions as agricultural commodity organizations and cooperatives).
Research on a number of tropical export crops grown under plantation conditions such as sugar, bananas, and rubber is often organized in this manner.
However, most agricultural commodities are produced by a number of small producers. Under these conditions voluntary cooperation to support research would be very costly to organize. Furthermore, most agriculturalcommodities, except those intended for export, are characterized by low price elasticity of demand. As a result, a major share of the social benefit produced by research tends to be transmitted to consumers through lower market prices. In such a situation the cost of agricultural research should be borne by the general public.
If agricultural research were left entirely to the private sector the result would be serious bias in the allocation of research resources. In the Philippines village case discussed earlier, changes in tenure and labor market institutions were supplied, in response to the changes in demand generated by changing factor endowments and new income streams, through the individual and joint decisions of owner-cultivators, tenants and laborers. But even at this level it was necessary for gains to the innovators to be large enough to offset the risk of ignoring the land reform prohibitions against subleasing and the social costs involved in changing traditional harvest-sharing arrangements. While mobilization of substantial political r-esources was not required to introduce and extend the new land and labor market institutions, the distribution of political resources within the village did influence the initiation and diffusion of the institutional innovations.
The supply of major institutional innovations necessarily involves the mobilization of substantial political resources by political entrepreneurs and innovators. It is useful to think in terms of a supply schedule of institutional innovation that is determined by the marginal cost schedule 21 facing political entrepreneurs as they attempt to design new institutions and resolve the conflicts among various vested interest groups (or suppression of opposition when necessary). We hypothesize that institutional innovations will be suppl~ed if the expected return from the innovation that accrues to the political entrepreneurs exceeds the marginal cost of mobilizing the resources necessary to introduce the innovation. To the extent that the private return to the political entrepreneurs is different from the social return, the institutional innovation will not be supplied at a socially . 1 1 15 optl.mum eve.
Thus, the supply of institutional innovation depends critically on the power structure or balance among vested interest groups in a society. If the power balance is such that the political entrepreneurs' efforts to introduce an institutional innovation with a high rate of social return are adequately rewarded by greater prestige and stronger political support, a socially desirable institutional innovation may occur. However, if the institutional innovation is expected to result in a loss to a dominant political block, the innovation may not be forthcoming even if it is expected to produce a large net gain to society as a whole. And socially undesirable institutional innovations may occur if the returns to the entrepreneur or the inte~est group exceed the gains to society [Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974; Tollison, 1982] .
The failure of many developing countries to institutionalize the agricultural research capacity needed to take advantage of the large gains from relatively modest investments in technical change may be due, in part, to the divergence between social returns and the private returns to political entrepreneurs. In the mid-1920's, for example, agricultural development in to the rising tensions between urban and rural interests, and to inappropriate domestic policies toward agriculture [de Janvry, 1973; Smith, 1969 Smith, , 1974 :~eavallo [Cochrane, 1979: 41-47, 179-88] . Strong nationalist sentiment in Meiji Japan, reflected in slogans such as 'A Wealthy Nation and Strong Army' (Fukoku Kyohei), helped mobilize the resources needed for the establishment of vocational schools and agricultural and industrial experiment stations [Hayami, et al., 1981] .
In China, communist ideology, reinforced by the lessons learned during the guer~ila period in Yenan, inspired the mobilization of communal resources to build irrigation systems and other forms of social overhead capital [Schran, 1975] . Thus, ideology can be a critical resource for political entrepreneurs and an important factor affecting the supply of institutional innovations.
Advances in social sciences that improve knowledge relevant to the design of institutional innovations that are capable of generating new 24 income streams or that reduce the cost of conflict resolution act to shift the supply of institutional change to the right. Throughout history, improvements in institutional performance have occurred primarily through the slow accumulation of successful precedent or as by-products of expertise and experience. Institutional change was generated through the process of trial and error much in the sa~e manner that technical change was generated prior to the invention of the research university, the agricultural experiment station, or the industrial research laboratory. With the institutionalization of research in the social sciences and related professions the process of institutional innovation has begun to proceed much more efficiently; it is becoming increasingly possible to substitute social science knowledge and analytical skill for the more expensive process of learning by trial and error.
The research that led to advances in our understanding of the production and consumption of rural households in less developed countries represents an important example of the contribution of advances in social science knowledge to the design of more efficient institutions [Schultz, 1964; Ner1ove, 1974; Binswanger, Evenson, F1orencio, and White, 1981] . In a number of countries this research has led to the abandonment of policies that viewed peasant households as unresponsive to economic incentives. And it has led to the design of policies and institutions to make more productive technologies available to peasant producers and to the design of more efficient price policies for factors and products.
Similarly, the diffusion of education designed to raise the intellectual level of the general public and to facilitate better understanding of the private and social costs of institutional change may reduce the cost to political entrepreneurs of introducing socially desirable institutions and raise the cost of biasing institutional change in a manner that is costly to society.
TOWARD A MORE COHPLETE MODEL OF INDUCED INNOVATION
We illustrate, in Figure 1 , the elements of a model that maps the general equilibrium relationships among resource endowments, cultural 
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In his book, Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel views the irrigation technology used in wet rice cultivation in East Asia as determining political organization [Wittfogel, 1957] . In terms of Figure 1 his primary emphasis was on the impact of resource endowments on institutions (C) and (B).
A serious misunderstanding can be observed in contemporary neo-Marxian critiques of the 'green revolution'. These criticisms have focused attention almost entirely on the impact of technical change on labor and land tenure relations. Both the radical and populist critics have emphasized
relation (B). But they have tended to ignore relationships (A) and (c).18
This has led to repeated failure to identify effectively the separate effects of population growth and technical change on the growth and distribution of income. The analytical power of the more complete induced innovation model was illustrated in the work by Hayami and Kikuchi, discussed earlier in this paper, on the impact of both technical change and population growth on changes in land tenure and labor market relationships in the Philippines.
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz identify a primary function of property rights as guiding incentives to achieve greater internalization of externalities. They consider that the clear specification of property rights reduces transaction costs in the face of growing competition for the use of scarce resources as a result of population growth and/or growth in product demand [Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973] . We also insist on the potential significance of cultural endowments, including the factors that economists typically conceal under the rubric of tastes and that political scientists include under ideology. But our capacity to develop rigorous relative significance of the empirical tests capab,~of identifying the relationships betweeniNtultural endowments and the other elements of the model outlined in Figure 1 is quite unsatisfactory.
Until our colleagues in the other social sciences provide us with more helpful analytical tools, we are forced to adhere to a strategy that focuses primarily on the interactions between resource endowments, technical change, and institutional change. The strategy suggested here does have the clear advantage of allowing us to explore how far a strategy based on the rather straightforward extension of standard microeconomic theory will take us in the analysis of both technical and institutional change.
NOTES
1. There is considerable disagreement regarding the meaning of the term institution. A distinction is often made between the concepts of institution and organization. We find the broad view which includes both concepts most useful for our purpose. This is consistent with the view expressed by both Commons [1950:24] and Knight [1952:51] . Our definition also encompasses the classification employed by Davis and North [1971:8-9] . We employ the more inclusive definition in order to be able to consider changes in the rules or conventions that 4. 'At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or--what is but a legal expression for the same thing--with the property relations within which they had been at work before.
From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution.
With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed' [Marx, 1913:11-12] .
For a discussion of the role of technology in Marxian thought see Rosenberg [1982:34-54] . Khan [1977] .
Thus, while we cannot be certain that the labor market was in equilibrium in the 1950's, it is clear that the degree of disequilibrium widened, as a result of both higher yields and lower wage rates, prior to the introduction and diffusion of the gamma system. 33 9. Harold Demsetz has pointed out that the relative costs of using market and political institutions is rarely given explicit consideration in the literature on market failure. An appropriate way of interpreting the 'public goods' vs. 'private goods' issue is to ask whether the costs.'of providing a market are too high relative to the cost of non-market alternatives. [1964] . A similar point is made by Leonid Hurwicz [1972] . Demsetz [1967] and Alchian and Demsetz [1973] .
11. See Olson [1968] . Several students of institutional change have emphasized that coordinated or common expectations resulting from the assurance provided by traditional institutions or common assumptions about equity or ideology have permitted much larger groups to engage in either implicit or explicit voluntary cooperation than implied by Olson's model. See and North [1981:54] . North notes that 'the premium necessary to induce people to become free riders is positively correlated with the perceived legitimacy of the existing institution.'
12. For a characterization of the nonrivalness and nonexcludability attributes of public goods see Samuelson [1954; 1955; 1958] and Musgrave [1959] .
13. Nonrivalness is an essential attribute of information. The use of information about a new farming practice (contour ploughing, for example) by a farmer is not hindered by the adoption of the same practice by other farmers. There is no capacity limit for its utilization. Nonexcludability, in contrast, is not a natural attribute of information but rather is determined by institutional arrangements. In fact, patent laws are an institutional arrangement that make a certain kind of information (called an 'invention') excludable, thereby creating profit incentives for private creative activities. Retention of trade secrets is another legally sanctioned method of retaining control over inventions or other forms of new technical knowledge. These arrangements are the ones designed to promote more efficient resource allocation through market arrangements as discussed in the previous section.
14. In a number of countries 'breeders' rights' and 'petty patent' legislation has induced rapid growth in private sector R&D related to agriculture.
See Ruttan [1982] and Evenson and Evenson [1983] .
15. See, for example, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young [1971] . For a review and extension of concepts of political entrepreneurship see Guttman [1982] .
16. Fusfeld [1980:33] [White, 1974 [White, :1158 . We use the term cultural endowments to capture those dimensions of culture that have been transmitted from the past. Contemporary changes in resource endowments, technology, and institutions can be expected to result in changes in cultural endowments.
18. A major limitation of the Marxian model is the emphatic rejection of a causal link between demographic change and technical and institutional change [North, 1981:60, 6lJ . This blindness to the role of demographic factors, and to the impact of relative resource endowments, originated in the debates between Marx and Malthus. An attempt to correct this deficiency represents the major innovation of the 'cultural materialism' school of anthropology. See Harris [1979] .
19. See North and Thomas [1970:l-l7a; 1973] . For a critical perspective on the North-Thomas model see Field [1981] . Field is critical of the attempt by North and Thomas to treat institutional change as endogenous.
20. See Olson [1982] . For a review of the Olson work see North [1983:163-64] .
